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Abstract
The present work analyzes the discrete dynamic of the SELIC interest rates-target defined in
the meetings of the Brazilian Monetary Policy Council (COPOM). The probit model
methodology was applied in order to study the probability of Central Bank increase or
decrease SELIC-target interest rate. We found that the inclusion of a fiscal (primary fiscal
surplus/GDP) and the lagged output gap variables must be considered important ones to
COPOM’s decision making processes.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  Since the ends of years 40, the monetarism of Milton Friedman already advocated a 
rule for the behavior of the monetary policy, establishing a target to the monetary aggregates 
growth rates. Such rate always would be constant and equal to rate of growth of GDP. His 
criticism and proposals had been oriented toward avoid discretionary behavior of monetary 
authorities in a time rules would impose discipline to the government, raising credibility and 
efficiency to monetary instruments. 
  Historically,  the  advocation  of  rules  based  on  monetary  aggregates,  caused  by 
financial  innovations,  and  institutional  changes,  and  unexpected  of  money  circulation 
velocity,  become  an  unsuccessful  event.  Although,  the  tribute  to  Friedman’s  seminal 
contributions on monetary policy has centered on inflation control to be the role monetary 
authority, according to Barro (2007).  
  Consequently,  the  simplicity  of  Friedman’s  rule  were  changed  by  important 
methodological and empirical innovations that enhanced the debate rules versus discretion on 
monetary policies as a filed of research the last century quarter. 
  In line to a theoretical discussion another one sourced by empirical results and the 
unsuccessful  monetary aggregate rules presented inflation target as guide to monetary policy 
since early of 1990.  That regime was adopted by New Zealand Central Bank in 1989/1990 
and currently has been followed for many countries, including not officially Federal Reserve 
Board (FED) in the United States, see Mankiw (2006). 
  In 1999, the Brazilian Central Banking also adopted that regime in order to search 
deflationary policies in substitution of nominal exchange rate anchor established since 1994. 
  A generalized characteristic of inflation target regime has been the use of Taylor’s 
rule, suggested by Taylor (1993), arranged as a guide for monetary policy and providing 
credibility,  flexibility  and  cleared  up  the  position  of  monetary  authority  what  must  be 
necessary  on  inflationary  and  developing  economies,  as  well  as  developed  and  non 
inflationary ones (see Taylor, 2000) 
COPOM’s decisions on SELIC interest  rate-target has been predicted by  financial 
institutions, economists, academics, and other ones, intending to know its motion. 
SELIC’s trend  alternated directions,  through the period from  July 1999 to August 
2006, proving the role of Central Bank in control aggregate demand and surpass inflationary 
inertia assuring inflation convergence for targets stipulated by National Monetary Council 
(CMN).  
The  apprehensive  market  behavior  appears  in  the  eves  of  COPOM’s  meetings  to 
decide the SELIC interest rate-target. So, the unknown parameters and determinant variables 
to COPOM’s choices explain market uncertainty.  
Therefore, this paper analyzed the dynamics of the SELIC interest rate-target from 
discrete approach. The specific objective was  to investigate  if the lagged  output  gap and 
inflation  deviations  from  the  inflation  target  would  be  determinant  factors  to  explain 
COPOM’s decisions for direction of SELIC interest rate-target motion. 
The  reminder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as follow:    in  section  2  was presented a 
discussion on rules of monetary policies; in section 3 was presented the data set and probit 
model methodology; in section 4 the results and a discussion were considerate; finally, in 
section 5 a conclusion were established. 
 
2. RULE OF MONETARY POLICY 
  According to Barro (2007), a proposal to fix a rule for monetary authorities constitutes 
the  Friedman’s  legacy,  mainly  Friedman’s  rule  and  seminal  contributions  on  monetary 
policies in the ends of the Forties.   2 
Amongst fixed rules and feedbacked ones the practical and accepted for its flexibility 
has beend Taylor’r rules, proposed by Taylor (1993), ans specified as: 
 
( ) 2 2 5 . 0 5 . 0 + − + + = p y p r                                                                                                    (1) 
 
where:  
r = is the federal funds rate; 
p = is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters; and 
y = is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target. 
As  Central  Bank  uses  the  nominal  interest  rates  to  minimize  inflation  and  output 
variations the equation (1) demonstrate that federal fund rate rises if inflation surpass a target 
of 2 percent or if real GDP is on target, and then the federal funds rate would be equal to 4 
percent.   
Questions about criticism to  this kind of rules would be that monetary aythorities 
would  use  rules  mechanically.  But,  economic  literature  has  no  evidence  from  mechanic 
aspects of Central Banks using rules. However, if rules are specified as equations like motion 
equation it still would be a mechanic formula. The suggestions for use monetary rules are that 
rules works out as guides, even to emergent countries. Taylor’s rule woul be an excellent 
example (see Taylor, 1993, p. 198-199): […] the term “policy rule” need not necessarily mean 
either a fixed setting for the policy instruments or a mechanical formula. 
Another question would be that the pragmatism of rules requires limited discretion 
except  on  situations  which  changes  on  monetary  instruments,  on  targets,  and  controlled 
variables requests. 
Original  Taylor’s  rules  presented  signicant  empirical  results  as  well  as  modified 
Taylor’s rule adapted to emergent countries. Thus, reactions’s function has been proposed and 
estimated  including  variables  alternatives  to  original  ones,  Dueker  (1999);  Clarida  et  al. 
(2000); McCallum (2000); Hamilton and Jorda (2002); Salgado et al. (2005); Carneiro and 
Wu (2004); Hu and Phillips (2004). 
In that collection of published papers, some authors used a discrete approach for the 
dynamics of the interest rates as an alternative to continuum, see Dueker (1999), Hamilton 
and Jorda (2002) and Hu and Phillips (2004). The present paper adopted that perspective in 
order to study the SELIC interest rate-target using probit model methodology. 
 
3. PROBIT MODEL METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
  The complexity of COPOM’s decision, once its members forecasts risks of inflation 
convergence to target, two basic variables are considered: lagged output gap and inflation 
deviations from a target. Therefore, would be necessary to verify if those variables determines 
the direction of SELIC’s motion: increase or decrease. Moreover, changing inflation deviation 
for inflation expectations (12 leads), as well as including a fiscal variable (primary fiscal 
surplus/GDP) were analyzed. 
Probit models methodologies are important to achievement of marked aims of this 
paper. They use cumulative distribution functions of standard normal distributions. Let be an 
occurrence of COPOM increase SELIC equal to one and other possibility, to decrease receive 
the attribute zero. So, generically the problem is presented as:   
( ) ( ) β β ´ 1 , 1 Pr i i i x F x y − − = =                                                                                                  (2) 
where: 
 F = a continuous and strictly increasing function;  
yi =  SELIC increased; 
xi = independent variables; and   3 
β = parameters.  
  The choice of the function F determines the type of binary model. The opposite option 
is determinated as: 
( ) ( ) β β ´ , 0 Pr i i i x F x y − = = .                                                                                                    (3) 
The estimation of model parameters is provided using maximum likelihood procedure 
given by equation (4):  
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.                                                          (4) 
The first order conditions for this likelihood are nonlinear so that obtaining parameter 
estimates requires an iterative solution. We use a second derivative method for iteration and 
computation of the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. 
  Statistics dataset  encloses  monthly frequencies from August of  1999 to  August  of 
2006  sourced  from  Brazilian  Central  Bank  (www.bcb.gov.br)  e  National  Bureau  of 
Geography and Statistics (www.ibge.gov.br). We used variations of official inflationary index 
– Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA), expectations of inflation measured to IPCA twelve 
leads, the lagged output gap considered monthly industrial production as appropriated proxy 
and its trends computed by Hodrick-Prescott filter, and primary fiscal surplus/GDP as a fiscal 
variable to be tested.  
  A gradualist procedure for SELIC interest rate-target has been announced by monetary 
authorities therefore would be corroborated by the evidence of short length and some trend 
inversions (see Martins, 2003, p.64). 
Figure 1 shows evidence for a gradualist procedure for the period from March 1999 to 
August 2006. In  Table 1 we  synthesize 19 decisions to increase SELIC-target and 39 to 
decrease from 89 meetings. Despite that the length of motions concentrates from 50 to 100 
point  base  in  absolute  terms.  Amongst  the  length  of  motions  we  concluded  decreases 
occurrences surpass in number increase ones. 
Also we appointed 32 days as average number for each motion, 147 to maximum 
number of days without motion, and 2 days to minimum. It determines that Brazilian Central 
Bank behavior excluding weekends and holidays. 
Another fact would be that uncommon inversions in trend occurred, characterized as 
inversions proceeded by opposite motion. So, from 58 determined changes on SELIC-target, 
19 increases and 39 decreases, only 7 represented trend inversion. 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
  We  specified  four  models  applied  to  data  set  in  order  to  predict  the  COPOM’s 
decision to direction of SELIC-target, as known: 
(i)  First model: inflation deviation  and lagged output gap as independent variables;  
(ii)  Second model: inflation expectations (12 leads) deviations and lagged output gap; 
(iii)  Third model: inflation deviation, lagged output gap, and primary surplus/GDP; and 
(iv)  Fourth model:  inflation expectations (12 leads) deviations, lagged output gap, and 
primary fiscal surplus/GDP. 
  Table 2 summarizes basic results to our four models. To first model both independent 
variables  (inflation  deviation  and  lagged  output  gap)  are  significant  in  explain  predicted 
probability of the COPOM to increase/decrease SELIC interest rate-target, caused by relation 
among variables.   
To  second  model  showed  higher  impact  for  inflation  deviation  on  COPOM’s 
decisions, and as in the first model the significance were the same one.  
 Based on the structures of both models we concluded inflation deviation and lagged 
output gap consisted in important parameters for market predictions on COPOM’s decisions.   4 
Inserting primary fiscal surplus/GDP in the analysis, see Table 2, we noted direct and 
significant  relation  to  that  fiscal  variable.  Maybe  the  mechanism  accorded  to  IMF  about 
primary surplus imposed a new target to monetary authorities and searching that aim caused 
statistical significant results.  
Coefficient values on binary models are troublesome and cannot  be considered as 
marginal effects on dependent variable. Marginal effects of xj independent variables vector on 
the conditional probability are given by: 
( ) ( ) j i
ij










, where  ( ) ( ) dx x dF x f / =  is F’s density function.                       (5) 
Note that βj is weighted by a factor f that depends on the values of all of the regressors 
in x. So, a form to present the marginal effect would be through the average of the derivatives, 
showed in Tables 3 to 5. 
Inflation deviation proportional differences  were distinguishable.  Noted in Table  3 
inflation deviation caused higher effect in COPOM’s decision to increase SELIC-target. So, 
Brazilian Central Bank is always declared the aims on convergence process of inflation to the 
target inflation and some concern on inflation level. 
The differences between Third and Fourth models are described by importance of 
primary fiscal surplus/GDP variable. Pursuing inflation deviation marginal effect behavior 
primary fiscal surplus/GDP constitutes an important variable and signal to market decisions 
on  COPOM’s  decision  processes.  Since  output  lagged  gap  maintained  its  robustness 
inclunding fiscal variable.  
The estimation coefficients process for binary models to investigate how probabilities 
predictions  changes  with  independent  variables  includes  plotting  ‘Probability  Response 
Curves’ to Fourth models. 
Suppose we are interested in the output lagged gap marginal effect on SELIC-target. 
To trace fitted SELIC-target probabilities as output lagged gap applying on SELIC-target fix 
primary fiscal surplus/GDP average (s). So, included/excluded output lagged gap and replace 
primary fiscal surplus/GDP to inflation deviation, see Greene (1997, chapter 19
th). 
Figure 2 presented estimation results for models that explain the increase on Selic-
target.  The  LR  statistics  and  p-values  showed  the  rejection  of  the  joint  null  hypothesis, 
implying in the overall significance of the models. McFadden R-squared revealed to it better 
in Fourth Model. 
We noted lagged output gap effect on probabilities, showed in Figure 3, to inflation 
deviations and primary fiscal surplus/GDP cases with and without lagged output gap. 
Another  measure  of  adjustment  for  models  with  binary  dependent  variable  is  the 
“fraction correctly forecast” that would  use the following rule: if Yi=1 and the predicted 
probability exceeds 50 percent, or if Yi=0 and the predicted probability covering other cases, 
established Yi is correctly classified. 
To  Fourth  Model  observations  41  covering  Yi=Dep=0  case  and  12  for  Yi=Dep=1 
alternative one. Overall, the model predicts correctly 92.98% of the observations (95.35% of 
the Dep=0 and 85.71% of the Dep=1 observations). For heteroskedasticity LM tests applied to 
the models they had indicated little evidence against the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, 
to see Table 2. 
After  remark  the  SELIC–target  increasing  behavior  we  searched  to  analyze 
complementary form to decreasing one. According to Table 4, perceived the asymmetry in 
relation evidenced in Table 2, that is, although some signals are theoretical supported by the 
impacts of the independent variable would be bigger in the direction of high of the interest 
rates. Persistence in reductions and some rigidity degree were remarked corroborating Table 1 
results.    5 
Table 4 reveals inflation expectations are important to COPOM’s decisions implied to 
aim of convergence to inflation target established by CMN. In addition to results inflation 
expectations  caused  higher  impact  on  expected  COPOM’s  decisions  in  decrease  SELIC-
target, see Table 5. 
Marginal  effects  for  primary  fiscal  surplus/GDP  attatched  to  inflation  deviations 
behavior illustrated differences for Third Model compared to Fourth one, mainly in opposite 
signals for variables coefficients. 
Lagged output gap presented robstness independent on model considered includind 
inflation deviations or not and includind primary fiscal surplus/GDP or not. As noted the 
estimated coefficients analyzed from “probability response curves”, Figure 3 and Figure 5, in 
both cases the lagged output gap effects were significant, besides the marginal difference in 
two fuctions displayed.  
LR  statistics  and  p-values  implied  significant  signals  to  models  parameters. 
McFadden’s R-squared revealed advantage to Fourth Model in our collection. The measure of 
“fraction correctly forecast adjustment” showed 30 of the Yi=Dep=0 observations and 15 of 
the  Yi=Dep=1  observations  are  correctly  classified.  Overall,  the  model  correctly  predicts 
78.95% of the observations (85.71% of the Dep=0 and 68.18% of the Dep=1 observations). 
LM tests for heteroskedasticity applied to the models also had indicated little evidence against 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, except to Third Model, to see Table 4. 
When  the  inversion  direction  probability  is  analyzed,  inputting  past  days  without 
changes,  daily  data  to  fixed  SELIC-target  the  estimated  probit  model  for  the  Brazilian 
economy from March/1999 to August/ 2006, with 58 movements in the SELIC-target were 
determined  by  COPOM,  which  them  7  represented  direction  inversion  displayed  in  the 
following equation to  SELIC interest rate-target inversion probability:  
( ) ( )
) 0053 . 0 ( ) 2475 . 0 (
035 , 0 203 , 3 1
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                                                                                               (6) 
  It’s verified parameters standard error significance at 1% significance level; moreover, 
59 , 0
2 = − R pseudo  showed reasonable model’s adjustment degree. This equation dissociate 
the  fact  of  sequences  of  increases  in  SELIC-target  changes  the  probability  of  direction 
invertion  of  SELIC-target  motion.  This  result  corroborated  results  obtained  for  Federal 




  This paper analyzed the dynamic of SELIC interest rates-target fixed by COPOM with 
a discrete approach using a probit model. For that the fundamental variables were inflation 
deviations and lagged output gap which presented direct relation with increase probability, 
and statistical significance to explain COPOM’s behavior for both covariates. We proved the 
aim of convergence of inflation expectation toward its target as an important objetctive of 
monetary  authorities.  Likewise,  including  a  primary  fiscal  surplus/GDP,  as  a  guideline 
accorded with IMF, we obtained statistical results rating decisions to increase of SELIC-target 
caused  by  negative  effects  of  higher  interest  rates  on  aggregate  demand  and  public  debt 
stokes. 
The probit model also permited to analyze the predicted probability of decrease in the 
SELIC-target. The results had shown an asymmetry COPOM’s behavior because independent 
variables presented higher coefficients in increases decisions compared with coefficients to 
decreases.  
Finally,  the  evidence  of  a  persistent  behavior  in  decreases  decisions  performing 
rigidity in reducing SELIC interest rate-target. The conduct of monetary policy aims inflation   6 
convergence toward a  target and it explain  the  changes  in mechanism decision  processes 
adopted by COPOM. 
New facts and results that lead to robust conclusion on Brazilian monetary policy 
should consider rigidity, persistence on monetary policy target, and asymmetry in decision 
processes.  The  future  research  would  conduce  to  explain  the  SELIC  interest  rate-target 
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 Table 1 – Motion and persistence in  SELIC interest rates-target 
SELIC interest rates-target 
Motion \interval    
>=100 p.b.  75 p.b.  50 p.b.  25 p.b. 
Number of motion  58 
22  5  23  8 
Increases Motion   19  5  1  10  3 
Decreases Motion   39 
17  4  13  5 
           
Direction Invertion  
 
07         
Average days for motions  32 
       
Maximum days without changes  
 
147         
Minimum days without changes  02 
       
Average days for  inversion and the previous 
changes 
234 
       

























* π π − t   0.3741*** 
(0.1187) 
  0.4248*** 
(0.1319) 
 









* π π − t E     1.2268*** 
(0.6171) 
  3.6245*** 
(1.4719) 















Notes: a e b => 07:1999-08:2006 and 11:2001-08:2006; *** level of significance of 1%, ** level of 




Table 3 - Marginal effects 
  1
st  model  2
nd model  3
rd  model  4
th  model 
) (
* π π − t   0,0739    0,0764   
1 − t h   0,0952  0,0759  0,0975  0,0500 
) (
* π π − t E     0,1929    0,3078 
1 − t s       0,1415  0,2692 
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* π π − t   -0.1194* 
(0.0640) 
  -0.1457** 
(0.0679) 
 









* π π − t E     -1.0987*** 
(0.3466) 
  -1.3520*** 
(0.4509) 















Notes: a e b => 07:1999-08:2006 and 11:2001-08:2006; *** level of significance of 1%, ** level of 
significance of 5%, * level of significance of 10%; ( ) standard errors. 
 
 
Table 5 - Marginal effects 
  1
st  model  2
nd model  3
rd  model  4
th  model 
) (
* π π − t   -0,0407    -0,0485   
1 − t h   -0,0575  -0,0398  -0,0612  -0,0294 
) (
* π π − t E     -0,2499    -0,2932 
1 − t s       0,1347  -0,1124 
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